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On  6  February this  year,  at the  end  of a  debate  whose 
urgency  and  variety are still very  much  in our  minds,  this  House 
adopted  two  resolutions,  The  first  expresses  the  opinion  of 
the  House  on  the  factual  situation in which  the negotiations 
for  United Kingdom  membership  of  the  European  Economic  Community 
were  interrupted,  ·rhe  resolution provides  an assessment  of  the 
event  from  the  political angle,  placing it against  the  general 
background  of  Buropean  integration.  After examining  the 
situation in  the  light  of  the  policy which it had  consistently 
followed,  the  ~uropean Parliament  drew  the first conclusions  on 
the  line  to  be  followed  by  our  Community. 
The  second  resolution runs  as  followsa 
"The  European  Parliament 
invites  the  European  Commission  to  report  to  it on 
the  state of  the  negotiations  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  six  countries  of  the  Common  Market  on 
29  January  1963. 
In this report  the  European  Commission  will  set  out 
both  the  results  already  obtained and  the  problems 
still outstanding and  will  give  its opinion  on  the 
latter. 
The  report  is  to  be  submitted  to  the  European  Parlia-
ment  within  three  weeks  and  will  be  discussed  by 
the  Parliament at its March  session." 
The  Commission  complied  with  this  req11est  and  transmitted 
the  Report  to  the  European  Parliament  on  2e  February.  It is  now 
before  the  House. 
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II 
As  I  have  the honour  of  intr••ducing this Report,  perhaps 
I  sh~uld begin  by  reminding ycu  just  h~w much  time  the  Commission 
had  tc  compile  it. After  the  close  of  the  session at  which  you 
adopted  the resolution calling fnr  a  Re)ort,  the  Commission  had 
first of all tr  decide  on  its scale,  character and  purpcise.  This 
was  done  as  s0on  as  the  c~mmission retu~ned to Brussels.  The 
necesaary instructions for  the  preparation cf drafts  were  given. 
A start had  already been  made  in collecting material.  Exactly 
a  week  and  a  half later the  Commission  ge-t  down  to  discussing 
in detail  the  fcrmulation  of  the  Report,.  and  this  lasted for  several 
meetings.  On  26  February the final  version was  apprrved  and  on 
28  February the  covering letter signed.  ~his enabled us  to  ijeep 
within  the  time-limit  Petby  the  Parliament,  but at  the  same 
time it meant  that  we  had little mare  than  ten  days  (and  nights) 
for  the  actual  work  nf writing  the  Report. 
III 
The  first questio':  that  arl')se  during  the  preparation of  the 
Report  - what  points  should  be  included  ..  was  easy to  answer.  '!'he 
Cemmission  restricted itself tn  the Parliament's  r~quest for  a 
report  on  the  state of negotiations  on  29  January.  So  it did  not 
gn  into  the  ge':leral  content  of  the  ·.rreaty of  RI'Jme  and  the  Community 
regulations  which  spring from it. It ignored ~:irngwhich had 
neither  come  up  in the  negotiat~ons nor been put  forward  by either 
side  as  a  subjent  fnr  subsequent  disaussion.  The  fact  that  in 
the  selection of  these  matters  the  wishes  and  desires  of  the British 
Delegation were  chiefly,though n0t  exclusively,  decisive is  n~ 
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accident  but .is  in  the  nature •f things.  ~ssentially,a new 
member  jcining the  C~'mmuni  ty  r;;ust  accept  the  ·rreaty rf R"'me 
and its implementing legislaticn as  they stand.  How  much  of 
all  this needs  to  be  changed,  h0w  mach  must  be  left out  ,.r 
added  in frar.-.ing  the  teri!B Jf  accession,  terms  whioh  in:· thel'\'iords  of 
Article  237  constitute  the  r8quisi te adaptation 0f  the  ·rreaty., 
is of  course first  and  foremost  a  r.latter for  the  State  applying 
for  membership.  S,.  it is  only natural  that  our H:eport, too, 
reflects  what  was  already discernible when  I  sp~ke on 5 February -
the  fact  that  the  negotiations rev•.l.ve  essentially around  the 
problems  of  the  CJmmonwealth,  of  British farming  and  of Britain 
belonging to  the  European  Fr-ee  rrad11!'-::JI~sJJ:oeia tion. - 4 -
IV 
In  its presentation of  these  problems  the  Commission  has 
again followed  the  order  in which  they  arose  during  the  negotia-
\\ 
tiens  - just as  was  done  in  the picture  I  gave  you  orally on 
5 February.  This  appeared  to us  to  be  the natural  sequence  and 
\j 
the  n.e  which  gave  the  most  lively picture of  the way  in which 
the  discussions  devel~ped during  the  Conference.  The  Rep~t 
theref~re deals  in  turn with: 
l.  General  questions relating to  the  Common  Customs  Tariff; 
2.  Commonwealth  problems,  which  aover 
a)  the  "white"  countries  of  the  Commonwealtha  Canada, 
Australia and  New  Zealand; 
b)  India,  Pakistan,  Ceylon  and  Hong  Kong; 
c)  the  problems  involved  in  assoc~ating the  dependent 
territories  in  the  Commonwealth  and  the African  and 
West  Indian countries; 
d)  the  other  Commonwealth  countries; 
e)  States  not  bel~neing to  the  Commonwealth  but  enjoying 
Commonwealth  preference; 
f)  problems  connected with  the  Commonwealth  and  Common-
wealth preference  (the  difference  in  timing,  or 
d6calage,  and  the  preferences  granted  by  the  Common-
wealth  countries  to  Great  Britain; 
g)  Cummonwealth  agricultural  exports; 
3·  British agriculture; 
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4.  ~he special  problem  of  the  financial  regulation as  part 
of  the  common  agricultural policy; 
5.  Economic  union; 
6.  The  problems  presented  by  the  interests of  other  E~ropean 
countries,  particularly the  members  of  the  European  ~ree 
Trade Association; 
1·  Legal,  financial  and  institutional  que1tions. 
v 
On  the  statements  contained in  the  Report  - the  material 
side  of  the  document  - I  can  be  brief. 
This is because all I  could  say by  w~ of  introducing 
this  rleport  to  the  House  h~s already  been  said when  I  spoke  to 
you at  the  beginning  of  the  debate  on  5  F~bruary.  The  statement 
I  made  when  I  had  the  honour  of addressing this  House  on  that 
occasion  - a  statement  which  expressed  the unanimous  opinion of 
the  Commission  and  which  gained  the  approval  of  the  House  - was 
not  merely  an  outline,  reduced  of  course  to  the  barest essentials, 
of  the  cause  and  results of  the  negotiations  in  their various 
phases;  it contained  an  assessment  of  tha outlook  for  the 
negotiations  when  the  Conference  was  interrupted.  It also  sketched 
the  Commission's  role  in  the  Conference -as intended by  the  six 
Governments  and  as  it worked  out  in practice.  It was  the  duty of 
the  Commission  to  give  its opinion  on  the  causes  leading to  the 
suspension  of  the  Conference,  and  my  statement contained that 
opinion. 
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The  Commission  has  not  changed  its views.  In preparing 
this Report  it has  endeavoured  to  supplement  the  statement  of 
5 February as  fully and  as  carefully  as  poesible  with details, 
to  go  more  exactly into points  which  at  the  time  could  only  be 
hinted at,  and  to  explain further  what  I  said  then.  The  Com-
mission  has  sought  to  present  an accurate,  complete  and detailed 
picture of  the  course  of  the negotiations,  of  the  results obtained 
and  of  the  failure  to  obtain results. 
~he European Parliament,  however,  wanted  the  Commission  to 
go  beyond  this  descriptive picture and  to  give its views  on  the 
problems  left outstanding.  Here  too  the  Commission  has  sought 
to  meet  the  wishes  expressed  by  the  Parliament,  The  result is 
that  an  expression  of opinion  occurs  at  many  points  in  the  Report. 
In formulating  these  opinions  the  Commission  was  conscious 
that it had  been  given  some  degree  of  latitude.  It must  be  said 
that  this  latitude has  been  very broadly interpreted - here  the 
Commission  believes it has  acted in accordance  with  the  intentions 
of  the Parliament. 
ha~ gone  too  far. 
to  the  lower  limit. 
We  very  much  hope it will  not  be  felt  that  we 
In any  case,  we  have  not  felt  ourselves  tied 
It seemed  to  us  that  the  least that  the 
Parliament  expected of us  when  it asked for  opinions  was  an 
assessment  of  the  difficulties  inherent in  the  problems  that  had 
not  been  solved.  For  one  of  the  motives,  indeed  a  major  motive 
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behind  the  mandate  given  us,  was  the  desire  of  the Parliament 
to  obtain a  clearer picture of  the  situation and  see  whether 
the  outlook  was  good  or  bad  at  the  moment  when  the  Conference 
on  the  accession  of Great  Britain was  interrupted.  The  upper 
limit was  the point at which  the  Commissi~n,  by  giving what it 
considered to  be  a  possible  solution,  uould  have  moved  into the 
sphere  of  speculation.  That  would  have  been  the  case if we  had 
sought  to  answer  the  question:  "\/hat  solution could  have  been 
agreed upon  by  the  seven  Governments  if  ~he negotiations  had 
not  been  suspended?"  We  did not  consider  that we  were  called 
upon  to  produce  a  phantasia of  this sort. 
Instead,  the  Commission  has  stuck  firmly  to  the  line laid 
down  for it by  the  part it had  to  play  in the negotiations. 
I  described  this part  on  5  February and  I  hope  that  the  House 
will  find  that what  I  had  to  say  then  has  been  confirmed  by our 
written Report.  It was  in line with  what  the  Commission  was 
doing  that  during  the  Conference  we  were  able  to  prepare  and  sub-
mit all but  one  of  the  compromise  proposals  which  eventually led 
to  partial  agreP.ments.  As  a  rule,  these  agreements  conformed 
with  our  proposals  or,  after certain changes  had  been  made,  were 
still so  similar that it is no  exaggeration  to  say  that  they 
were  based  on  our  proposals.  This  was  no  do~bt  so  because  the 
Commission  endeavoured  to  make  proposals  which  were  correct  in 
substance  and  which  from  the  tactical anale  had  a  good  chance 
of  being accepted.  Its first  care,  in aocordance  with its 
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constitutional responsibilities,  had  to  be  to  ensure  that  the 
solutions  suggested  were  in line with  the  Treaty and  the  other 
legal  rules  of  the  Community  and  that  they  should premote  the 
further  development  of  the  Community,  not  undermine  it.  At  the 
same  time  our  prtposals  had  to  take  into account  the  difficulties 
facing;:  the  candidate  for  membership  in its effort to.adapt  itself 
to  the  Community  - and,  as  the  Report  shows,  theee  were  con-
siderable.  Finally we  had  to  take  into account  - and  the need 
to  do  so  was  particularly evident,  as  it had  been  the  unanimous 
wish  of  the  Governuents  that  the  negotiations  should  be  in the 
form  of a  multilateral  conference  - the  individual  interests of 
the  existing Member  States as  expressed at  the  Conference  by  the 
six delegations.  In  practice  therefore  the  discussion  of  a  given 
problem  never  began with  a  proposal  by  the  Commission,  but  our 
proposals  were  made  after  the  relevant factors  and  the  interests 
of  the  various  countries  had  been  sufficiently aired for  the 
proposals  to  be  framed  with  good  chances  of  success,  since  they 
made  due  allowance  for all the points  of  view  that  had  been  put 
T  forward,  his  means  that  deductions  from  the  position  reached 
in  the  negotiations  on  29  January  will still not  give  us  a 
reliarle picture  of  the  trend  of  the  solutions, 
In view  of  this,  the  Commission  began  by putting into its 
Report  the  proposals  and  suggestions it had  made  during  the 
Conference,  either at meetings  of  the  Seven  or  in the  discussions 
'1'  at  whi~h the  Six  co-ordinated  their views.  he  Report  gives full 
details and  describes  Ahat  happened  to  the  various  suggestions  in 
the  subse~uent discussions, 
···I·~· - 9  -
In aidition,  wherever  the  Commis1ion  felt that  the 
Conference  was  clearly on  the  read  t~  a,reement,  the  CAmmission 
points  this out,  even if agreement  was  not actually reached, 
and  gives its t"pinion  on  the value  of  tbe  Sl)lution being aimed at. 
Nor  has  the  Commission  hesitated to  suggest  the direction 
in which  a  solution might  be  faun~ even when  such  a  s~lution was 
not yet  to hand;  it has  at least indicaled the  criteria  t~at 
should be followed  if a  solution consonant  with  the Treaty and 
its implementing regulations  is tc be  found. 
In so  doing,  we  hope  we  have  fouad  the  happ~ mean  in the 
dilemma  confronting us  - the  dilemma  be~weer. giving too  much  or 
too little of our  cwn  'Jpinion  on  the  state of negotiations  and 
the possibilities they offered. 
VI 
Tt')  sur.1  up,  I  may  define  our  purnose  in this Report  in the 
following words  :  we  have  aspired to  be~'<lmo-tly.'JOl\.fecti,re;  ,, 
We  started out  with  no  preconcei,•ed ideu about  the situation, 
and  we  had  no  tactical  aim  in view  when  drawing up  the Report. 
We  believe  that  in this  way  we  are serging both  historical  truth 
and  the  requirements  of  the  situation,  1hat is,  the  need  to  do 
whatever  can  in  the  circumst. noes  of  today  nake  t~1e  best contri-
bution to  the  development  of  the  Cotamunity  and  the  solution of 
outstanding ·:)roblems.  '1/e  cannot  c-f  course holci  up  either the 
·ievelopment  of the  C-:-mmuni ty or  the  '1e l;tlement  of  our relations 
with the  outside world until  the  day when,  as  we  suppose,  the 
United Kingdom  will  have  become  a  member  of  the  Community.  Even 
under  changed  circumstances,  the  tasks before us still remain, 
and  we  must  approach  the;: with  a  clear mind  and  with  confidence. 
'•le  cannot  allow ourselves  t(·  be  bogged  down  in disappointment 
and  resignation.  That  would  be  giving up  any  p~licy at all and 
would  be  the  end  of us.  No,  we  must  fix  our  eyes  resolutely on 
the future. 
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A]ow  me,  then,  to  close  this intro4uction to  our Report 
on  past  events  with  a  wcrd  on  the  immediate future.  De3pite all 
the  caution still demanded  bJ the  situation,  mere  can be  said 
today  than  was  possible  on  5 February.  ·rhe  positions  of  those 
directly and  indirectly concerned,  particularly our member 
Governments,  are more  cl~arly visible. 
I  shall begin with  the  c~~munity's external relations, 
and  I  beg your  indulgence if whatever  I  s~ should  impinge  on  the 
debate  on  the excellent report  subrni tted ly 1\i.  B~aisse on  behalf 
~fthe Foreign  rrade  Committee  of this Hou1e. 
VII 
First, Britain.  ';/e  de  not  kn.,w  when  the negotiations will 
be  resumed.  So  there is surely no  objection tc  our probing the 
possibility  ~r intermediate solutions  and  trying to  work  them  out~as 
farf a.s  .posaL.obl.B.J.tltlt quick results are hardly to be  expected.  This 
is particularly true of  the  ass~oiation formula,  as far as it has 
5ny specific  content.  The  British reaction is one  of  reserve. 
The  Americans  have  never  thought  much  of  the  idea of  a  free  trade 
area,  which  to  them  means  tr '.de  discrir,lin!ltion without  compensating 
political advantages,  and  they are  sceptiaal about  a  partial  customs 
unicn.  In  the  Cemmunity,  toe,  there is  so~e hesitation about  a  customs 
union which  excludes  agriculture.  Furthermore,  each  of  these  types 
of association would  require  len~'hy negotiations.  There  remain 
procedural  expedients  of  the  type  used  in the association between 
Great Britain and  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community.  It is 
also possible,  without  making  f0rmal  arrangements,  at least to 
intensify diplomatic  contacts  as  part of  the  slowly  evolving  common 
commercial  policy,  pa.rticularly the  contacts between  the  Community 
itself and  the United  Kingd~m.  This  would  at least keep  the ball 
rolling and  do  something  towards  preparing future  action.  On  the 
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psycholbgical  plane  ge  obviously all uant  to  prevent  any 
estrangement  between  Great  Britain and  ourselves,  and  on  the 
material  side  to  av,..l_d  any unnecessar;y  increase  in  the  gap 
which  separates  us  economically,  without  of  course  going as 
far as  providing for  a  vet....  'l'hi s  calls  for  continuous  mutual 
effort,  which  in  turn  is  only possible if there  is permanent 
contact. 
VIII 
Far  more  important  than  the  individual  case  of Britain, 
ho~r'3ver,  is  the  point  I  made  on  5 February  - and  I  hope  that  this 
to• has  been  confirmed  by  our Report.  I  said that we  were  coming 
out  of  the  negotiations  with  a  more  lively awareness  of  the  way 
in  vrhich  our  Community  is woven  into  the  vtarp  and  woof  of inter-
natio&al  relations,  with  a  deeper  knowledge  of  the  problems  that 
this raises,  and  with  a  greater  sense  of  the  urgency of  the  topics 
being discussed.  Consequently, the  problems  which it seemed it 
~ould be  possible to  solve  as  part  of  the United  Kingdom  negotia-
tions,  or  in connection with  them,  have  n~t ceased  to  ~xist 
be~ause the  negotiations  have  been  suspended  - except  in a  few 
special  cases  concerned with  Britain's  membership.  Vhat  is 
required  of  the  Community  has  therefore  not  grown  less,  it has 
only  changed. 
This  appliesfor  a  start  to  a  large  p&rt  of  the  underdeveloped 
world.  Solutions  for  the African  countries  of  the  Commonwealth 
were  beginning  to  be  visible  and  a  particularly interesting kind 
of  solution  had  been  reached  for  countries  as  important  as  India 
~nd Pakistan.  These  solutions  were  in part  the  result  of  the 
peculiarly British problem;  they  vere  necessary because  Britain's 
mombership  would  have  spelled  the  end  of  Commonwealth  preference. 
But  they  were  also  due  to  another factor  - the  external  impact  of 
the  Community, 
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s~ we  must  now  exanine,  precisely and rith reference  to 
specific problems,  but  much  b-ene-fit  c.an:rb!e.-dzfa:wn  .fi'om•alL"thB-·expe-
rience  we  have  gained.  In doing so  we  shall have  to  take  into 
account  both  the fact  that many  problems  change  theircharacter when 
we  take  them  ~ut of  the  context  of  the British negotiations,  as  we 
are now  doing,  and  also  the fact  that  the  scale  of  the  problems 
changes  with  the  change  of  context.  For it I;tay  well  be  asked whether 
the solutions  that must  now  be  sought  can be  limited to  Comraonweal th 
countries.  All  this is an  important  part of  commercial  policy, 
of  a  modern  and  dynamic  commercial  policy that  ce~ no  longer be 
defined as  narrowly  and  conservatively as before.  Just  as  the laissez-
fairs of  the nineteenth  century evolved into  the  complex  forme 
of  modern  economic  and  social policy,  our classical  trade  policy 
is now  turning into  e.  comprehensive  system regulating the  activity 
of  a  civilized and  free  world  co,scious of its interdependence. 
IX• 
Basically the position is much  the  same  with regard  to  our 
European  neighbours.  The  first result  of  the  suspension  of  the 
United  Kingdom  negotiations  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  discussions 
with  these  countries  also. 
Does  this raise  an  immediate  ;Jroblem  in  the light  of  the 
continued progress being made  by  our  customs  union  ?  N~ general 
answer  can be  given  to  this  question.  It depends  on  the  individual 
situation,  on  the  gengra;hical  conditions,  on  the  competitiveness 
of  these  furopean  neigh:bours,  it depends  which  are  the  111ain  economic 
sectors  concerned  and  how  far  they depend  in their foreign.  trade 
on  the  EEC.  We  should not  - and  the Blaisse Report  hints at this 
problem - rule  out  the possibility  that  in a  given  case,  should 
really serious  economic  reasons  make  it necessary,  use  should  be 
made  of special  met~ods and  solutions  which  might  be  quite unorthodbx 
and  should  consequently not  be  looked upon  as  a  precedent. 
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Only  one  thing can be  said in general:  the  problems  cf 
our  European  neighbours,  like  those  of  Great Britain,  must  for 
the present be  looked  on  in a  wider setting which  includes 
the  United States  and  other industrialized countries  such as 
Canada  and  Japan.  In this setting the general  trend is  tnwards 
increased tariff  liberalization.  But  this is just the  p~licy 
which  is mt•at  likely to  ease  the  commercial  difficulties separating 
us  fr~m our  huropean friends,  to  take  the  sting out of them  and 
possibly to  bring a  lasting solution nearer,  even if it cannot be 
a  substitute for  auch  a  solution. - 14  -
X 
There  .. is therefore nothing artificial or far-fetched  in this 
line of  thought  when  it is carried logically through  to  the next 
maj~r round  of tariff negotiations,  the Xennedy  Round  on  the basis 
of the  Trade  Expansi~n Act.  FJr  the  Community  these negotiations 
will fulfil_  three purposes. 
They  will  provide  a  means  of'  taking the sting uut  of  a 
number  of specific problems  and  of  providing at least a  partial 
solution to  them;  at present  these  problems  cannot,  owing  to 
the  suspension of the negotiations  on  United Kingdom  membership, 
be  solved in any  0ther manner. 
They  will  be  an  essential factor in building a  . .bipartite 
Atlantic partnership which  lacks  nothing but  European  integration, 
with  the  closest  economic  interdependence,  in order  to gain the 
stability which  alone  can  assure  the  st~fety of  the free world. 
Ita importance  points' to  sometting  beyond·tboL~G~nomic sphere: 
'far it·i& b~c.Ol:lin~-stoad:tl;Y:tc:tre.:ili!cr·~t6. 1~arl· and ~s'llndry that 'the 
socond  alement  tn•our  Hlan1lic.relationship, that of .a  joint defenGe, 
is most  closely bound up.with  th~-economie elementJ ·polit!oally the 
two  £>laments  n.r.~  mere1y  the·~~bv~·rse  anJ.:~ri'V'Efrs~ ·of -the  same  medal. 
The  third purpose  which  this  round  of tariff negotiations 
will  serve  for  the  Community  is that it will  be  an  exceptionnlly impor-
tant factor in the  shaping of  the  Community  itself.  In  these negotia-
tions  we  must  of  course  maintain and  defend  our individuality, but 
at  the  same  time it is  just by  means  of  these negotiations  that 
r 
we  will be able  to  round  c.ff  our  individuality.  The  C!"mmuni ty must 
establish its image  in the  world  as  an  economic  and  trading partner 
in the bioadest  sense  of  the  word  J.nd  show  that it has  the qualities 
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which  the Treaty seeks  to  give it, showing  a  sense  of respon-
sibilitJ,  thinking in world-wide  terms  and  acting in liberal fashion. 
The  Community  has  always  resisted attempts  to dissolve it in larger 
units,  like sugar in tea.  It intends  that  in the future  to~ it shall 
be  recognized  as  a  partner in it§  own  right and  treated as  such,  not 
as  someo"'le  who  has  as it were  h'apologize for existing.  From  the 
preparations which  are now  moving  ahead rapidly it has becoue  evident 
that  the negotiations will raise di '.'fioul  t  problems  of substance  on 
both sides.  On  my  last visits to  america I  have  often been asked in 
anxious  tenes  whether  the  coming  negotiation. between  the United 
States and  the  EuroTlean  Community  are going  t1o  be  "hard".  Ily  regular 
answer  was  t  "If I  know  the  American  negotiators,  they will  1". 
Any  negotiation of this sort is of  course  a  matter of give  and  take. 
It is not  without  reason  that ample  time  has been allowed for  them; 
tu  expect  too  much  too  quickly  ~ould. endanger everything. 
This  makes  it all  the  m•re  important  that  the negotiations 
should be  conducted in the right frame  of min4  and  on  a  constructive 
basis.  As  far as  the  Community  is concernee,  this is provided by 
our constitution,  by  the  Treaty  ~f Rome,  in iis preamble,  in Article 
18,and in Article  110,  which  lays  dnwn  that  tae aim  of our  comm~n 
commercial  policy shall be  "the harmonious  deTelopment  of world 
trade,  the  procrJJsive abolition of restrictions  on  international 
exchanges  and  the  lowering of  customs  barriers". 
.  .. ; ... - 16  -
XI 
This  is a  rough  outline  of  the  situation >le  are  left vlith 
now  that  the  negotiations  have  been  interrupted,  or,  to  put it 
more  correctly,  of  a  situation that  has  become  if possible  even 
clearer than  before  because  of  the  interruption.  But  does  the situ-
ation of  our  Community  allow us  to  approach  the  tas~before us, 
tnsk:J  nhich are as  urgE:·nt  as  they  :1rc  extensive:·  iLJ.V8  ·ae  the  r<:quisite 
d.ogree  of  unity?  Is  the  r~::adine.c;s  to  ta•;:itle  th8  taE;I-:.3  wide~"!preo.d 
enough'?  Or  are  ne  in  a  cul-de-sac  in which  no  move1:1ent  is 
possible?  Ue  cannht_blame  anyone  who  ~ishes to  ask  such  questions. 
But  hist0ry will  not  pause  over  these.  History  makes  its demands, 
and  we  cannot  dodge  them.  But  no;·r  people  are  alsc  saying that  no 
progress  in external  matters  - or,  to  put it another  way,  no 
mastery  0f  the  external  problems  from  which  we  cannot  escape  -
is  possible  till progress  has  been  made  \7i thin  the  Community. 
l'his  is correct  in  two  respects,  but  at  the  same  time  it is  formulated 
tl"o  0ne-sidedly. 
Firstly,  it is correct  to  the  extent that  there  must  be  a 
strong  Community  before  we  oan  make  great  advanc~s in  the  shaping 
~f our  commercial  p0li~y or,  to  put it more  generally,  of  our 
relations  r;ith  the  world  around  us;  and  we  can  have  a  strong  Commun-
ity only if we  have  a  dynamic  Gommunity.  Secondly,  the  premise  is 
correct  in  so  far  RS  the  problems  facing  us  without  and  within are  in 
every  oase  the  expression  of  certain interests.  But  these  interests 
must  be  considered,  taken  j_nto  account  and  dealt with as  a  whole;. 
they  cannot  be  isolated arbitrarily,  ntherwise  tension arises  and 
leads  finally  to  complete paralysis, 
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But  this also  sho\·ts  the  extent  to  vthich  this  premise  is 
formulated  t~'o  onc-sidedly.  If we  may  say  that  external  progress 
depends  on  progress  at  home,  then it can  be  said vti th  equal iijustioe 
that  progress  at  home  depends  on  external  progress,  Similarly, 
business affairs at  home'  and  business  relations  abroad  are  matters 
vthich  affect  the real  inter2sts  both  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
group,  Consequently,  11ny  point  of  vie·:r  based  on  individual  circum-
stances is false.  'lhat  is necessary  is  a  composite  view  taking in 
all aspects  of  the picture  nnd  doing  justice to1all interests, 
So  we  shall  have  to  treat  cur  manifold  tasks  as  one  whole  -
certainly in  generous  rath0r  th11n  in niggardly  fashion,  certainly 
in pragmatic  manner  rather  than  •.ri th  the  eyes  of  the  idealist  -
but  definitely as  a  single  pnckage.  To  do  so  is certainly 
legitimate.  In  so  close-knit  an  organization as  a  Community,  too, 
the  confrontation and  adjustment  of interests is admissible;  it is 
even  necessary  - provided  that  behind  this  exercise  there  is  the 
~7ill  to  strenEthen the  organization  and  promote  its development, 
At  tho  same  time  the  Commission,  drawing its inspiration  from 
the  Action  Programme  to  which  your  Resolution  of  6  February  makes 
specific  reference,  \Jill  not  evade  thG  huge,  difficult and  re-
sponsible  task  of  helping  to  fra.mo  such  a  cpmprehensive  policy, 
any  more  than it evaded  a  sirn:i_lar  task  which  is still fresh  in 
our  memories  - that  of  linking  the  transition to  the  second  phase 
of  the  transitional  period  ·1ith  the  shaping of certain policies 
which  the  Treaty did  not  ~uto~atically link  ~ith the  decision 
takeL under Article  A. 
What  ~xactly this  means  can  already  be  partially recognized: 
the  draft  dccisiornthat  have  beeL  subffiittcd  to  the  Council  and 
the  preparn. tions  for  general  in  t,~rna tional  negotiations  in  the 
enonomic  sphere  indicate  the  lines  along  ~hich internal  dif-
ferences  will  hav~ to  be  resolved.  It will  be  our  task  to  give 
a  positive slant to  any  inclination  to  impose  conditions  or  block 
progress  nnd  so  to  onsure  that  events  follow  a  constructive  course. - 18  -
XII 
This  too  makes  it clear  that  we  need  a  Community  resting 
on  strong institutions  imbued  with  growing  self~assurance 
because  they realize that  they  have  to  perform specific  tasks 
which  can  be  fulfilled  by  no  one  else,  institutions alive  to 
their responsibility for  solving  these  problems  and  resolved  to 
act  in a  manner  befitting their responsibility.  The  con-
stitutional set-up  of  our  Community  is not  an  instrument  serving 
the particularist policies of  the  Member  States  but  the  instrument 
of  the  Community's  own  policy  as  laid down  in the  Treaty.  If we 
look  bnck  on  the  five  years  which  have  provided  such  an  unprecedented 
test of our  Community,  in which  r1e  have  seen the  growth  of  enormous 
vested interests  that underpin  this  Community,  we  are  tempted  to 
believe  that its constitutional  set-up is  such that it will  be  able 
to  stand up,  in the  future  as  in  the  past,  to  any  strains  imposed 
upon it. 
Of  course,  if we  measure  the  available instruments  against  our 
final  purpose  - the political unification  of Europe  - much  remains 
to  be  desired:  the  European Parliament's  position  must  be  strengthened 
by  means  of direct elections  and  by  increasing its share  in Commun-
ity legislation and its powers  of  supervision;  there  must  be  a 
rationalization of  the  three  European  Communities  through  the  merging 
of  their Executives;  the  process  of  integration,  which  up  to  now  has 
only included  economic  and  social policy in the  Member  States,  must 
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be  extended  to  other spheres  - particularly non-economic  foreign 
affairs  ~nd def0r.c8.  The  Commission  h~s  ~ade its basic  position 
in all these  matters  clear  from  the  start,  and  there  is  no  need  to 
repeat  the  arguments  on  which  this position is based.  \le  regard 
strengthening Parliament's  role as  the  most  essential  point  of 
constitutional progress;  wo  regard  the  merger  uf  the  ~xccutives 
as  a  matter of  common  sense;  and ue  regard the unification of 
those  spheres  kno1m  as  pure  policy  - in a  for~ that does  not affect 
the existence,  ~orking and  momentum  of  what  has  been  achieved  -
as  a  necessary  extension  of  economic  and  social  integration, 
economic  union  leads  by  its  own  logic  to  full political union. 
Nor  should  ue  forget  that  the  intern~l strengthening of  the 
Community  contr.ibutes  ~o  its  f~l?ogr:cpl-)j ~al  enl8.rgement. 
In view  of  thE  ~ ·JuljRrities  of  th2  current situation,  houever, 
a  further  conside~ation comes  to  rrind.  It is not  sufficient  simply 
to  develop  a  procedure  vi1ich  has  rw  in·~·~:-nnl  dync-.mism  and  embodies 
no  Community  intcree1t  as  distinct  L·mn  inrliviJ.ual  interests,  Ire-
peat  that ne  and  the  Euro:;>can  Pa:clicvncnt  haye  often  said when  certain 
variants  of  what  is  know1  as  "Poli"':ical  'Jnion"  have  been  under  dis-
cussion:  this  ~~~:d  1 ~  ~  r:trogra~e  ~tap.  No~ nould it be  acceptable 
if an  attempt  were  made  to  superimpos(:i  on  t~£;  cc·i·.stitution of  our 
Community,  or  tc  undermin~ or  supplant  that  constitution by  intr0duc-
ing,  a  political structure  based  on  ideas  other  than  those  whiuhi 
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have  been  observed in our  Community  life for  twelve  years  and 
by virtue  of which  the  Member  States  have  all been  prepared 
to  gain  joint progress at  the price  of renouncing individual 
interests.  This  must  be  the  criterion by  which  we  judge  any 
arrangement  that  channels  the  problems  of  common  interest 
dealt qith in our  institutions into  special  forms  of preliminary 
examination and  cause  them  to  be  dealt with  by 1pecial procedures 
which  differ from  those  we  are now  using. - 21  -
XIII 
This  brings  me  to  a  question that vas  put in  this  House 
during  the  debate  on  5  Februn.r;y  and  has  since  been repeatedly 
put  to us  - the  question of our attitude  to  the  Franco-German 
treaty nf  22  January. 
\fe  are ae  aware  as  anyone  else of  the significance  of  the 
basic political fact  that is  to  be  re-affirmed by  this  treaty -
the  Franco-German reconciliation inaugurated  by  Robert  Schuman 
and Konrad  Adenauer.  This  fact  is not  only an  immeasurable 
contribution  to  peace  in Europe  and  throughout  the  world: 
there  is also  no  doubt  that without it any attempt  to  achieve 
complete, lasting unity in  Europe  would  be  in vain.  Furthermore, 
we  have  no  reas~n to  see  in  the unfortunate  coincidence of  the 
conclusion of  the  treaty  •.ri th  the  interruption of  the  British 
negotiations  - a  coincidence  that  h~s  ha~ considerable  influence 
on  people's reaction  to  the  treaty- any trace  of  an agreed 
plan directed against  the  geographical  enlargement  of  our 
Community  and against.its constitutional development.  But  the 
scope  of  this  treaty extends  specifically to  matters  relating 
to  the  European  Communities.  The  consultation  to  which  the  con-
tracting parties  bind  themselves  "on all important  questions  of 
foreign  policy  •••  yfi th  a  vieYr  to  roaching as  far as  possible  an 
analogous  position" also  covers  "problems  relating to  the  European 
Communities"·,  "East-Jest relations  both on  the  political and 
economic  planes",  and  "matters  dealt with within  ••.  the various 
international  organizations" •.  Each  country also  intends  to 
examine  its  O\m  development  programme  in  the  light of  the 
corresponding programme  drawn  up  by its partner, 
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and  to  study  the  possibility of undertaking joint projects. 
The  treaty also  lays  dovrn  that  "'iri thin  the  framework  of  the 
Common  Market"  there  shall  be  reinforcement  of co-operation 
'~n other important  sectors  of  economic  policy,  such as agri-
cultural  and  forestry policy,  energy policy,  communications  and 
transport  matters  and  industrial  de~elopruent,  and  expo~t crodit 
policy",  Each  of  the  inter-departmental  commissions  in Paris 
and  Bonn  is also required  to  stimulate  the extension of 
the  programme  to new  fields.  On  the  organizational  level, 
provision iB  made  not  only  for  regular moetings  of  the  Heads  of 
State and  Government,  of  the  Foreign Ministers  and  of Foreign 
Ministry officials,  but  also  for all necessary contacts  between 
the  two  countries'  permanent  representatives at internationo.l 
organizations  (Ythich  will  include  the  Colllllunities). 
The  Commission,  which  is  specifically charged with  the 
guardianship  of  the Treaty  ~f Rome,  believes  that these  circum-
stances  require it to  make  the  following observations  (and  I  would 
state  that  the  Commission  han  examined  the  content  of  the  Franco-
German  treaty entirely without  prejudice and  has  obviously not 
imputed  to  either signatory any  intention to  act in  contravention 
of its Community  obligations),  The  criterion of  the  Commission's 
judgment  is not any  formal,  legalistic  one  - indeed it considers 
in any  case  that  the  heart  of  the  matter is political  - but  rather 
the  "philosophy"  of  the Treaty itself - the  interest in a 
Community  11hose  substance  and  dynamic  force  is unimpaired,  in 
other  words  in  the  assured and  unrestricted.execution of  the 
substantive  aontent  of  the  Treaty and  in  the  smooth  and  fully 
effective  functioning of  the  Community's  constitutional  set-up  • 
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It is with  this  sort  of consideration in mind  that  the  C"mmis-
sion must  ask whether  the  material  conditions  for  the  co-opera-
tion of  those  forces .to  which  our  Treaty confides  Community 
policy may  not  be  changed  by  the  application of  the  consultation 
procedure set up  by  the Franco-German  treaty in a  manner  not 
consonant uith the spirit of  the  Treaty  af  Rome.  The  Council  in 
particular is of course  not  a  diplomatic  conference  in uhich 
a  consensus  among  the  agreed  positions  a! the  various  delegations 
is reached by additions  and  subtractions'  it is the legislative 
organ of  the  Community  where,  in discussicn among  the members 
and  a  continual  dialogue  with  the  Commission,  reasons and counter-
reasons are  weighed  and  a  balance  is  souaht  between  individual 
interests and  the  Community  interest.  Compulsory prior con-
sultation between  two  member  Governments  - with  the purpose,  as 
the Franco-German  treaty puts it, of  reaohing as  far as possible 
analogous  positiens  - introduces  into  this balanced  Community 
process  a  new  element  that  is  foreign  to  the  Treaty - especially 
if extraneous  arguments  (by  which  I  mean  arguments  unconnected 
with  Community  affairs)  havebeen  thrown  into  the  scales  of bilateral 
compromise.  I  repeat:  these  are  developments  that  may  derive  from 
the  nature  of  the  matter and  do  not  impl7 any ill uill  in those 
participating.  One  need  only imagine  a  treaty of this  kind  being 
concluded  among all six Member  States  of  the  Community  to  see 
immediately that conformity with  the  Treaty  of  Rome  could  then  only 
be  achieved  by  transferring all consultation  on  Community  affairs 
to  the  Community  organs  themselves.  Thie  need  not  be  taken  so  far as 
to  in&inu~te- and  this certainly cannot  be  deduced  from  the  past 
attitude  of  the  two  Governments  - that  censultation might  grow 
into a  systematic  pooling of votes  - a  combine  between  two  partners 
whose  co-ordinated votes  could  make  it impossible  to  reach a 
qualified majority in  the  Council. 
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